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VERY academic can name an article or two that they wish
they had written, and for me the top of that list has always
been occupied by Judge William Fletcher's "The General Common
Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of
Marine Insurance." ' Judge Fletcher's essay is the best thing we
have on the phenomenon of "general common law"-the law applied by both state and federal courts to commercial disputes before the regime of Swift v. Tyson' gave way to that of Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins.3 The general common law was a form of customary international law ("CIL"); hence, the nature of the general law
regime and the precise sense in which Erie altered that regime lie
at the heart of contemporary debates about enforcement of a dif* Charles Alan Wright Chair in Federal Courts, University of Texas School
of Law.
I am grateful to Kalani Hawks for research assistance and to my friend Judge Fletcher
for insight and encouragement over many years.
97 Harv. L. Rev. 1513 (1984).
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842) (holding that federal courts sitting in diversity are
not bound to follow state court interpretations of the general common law that then
governed commercial disputes).
'304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (overruling Swift and holding that federal courts must ordinarily apply state law in the absence of an applicable federal statute or constitutional
provision).
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ferent kind of customary law-international human rights principles-in U.S. courts.4 Commenting upon Judge Fletcher's reading
of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,' the leading recent case on human
rights claims under CIL, is thus a task that I approach with both
great honor and some trepidation. Fortunately, our differences are
less important than our areas of common ground.
I will start with the apparent disagreement. Judge Fletcher reads
Sosa to establish "two things that perhaps we did not know before": First, "there is a federal common law of international human
rights based on customary international law." Second, "the federal
common law of customary international law is federal law in both
the jurisdiction-conferring and the supremacy-clause senses."' If
these two propositions are correct, then Sosa embraced the "modern position" on CIL-that is, the doctrine propounded by internationalist scholars but never before embraced by the Supreme
Court, that CIL is equivalent to federal common law, and that such
law necessarily both confers federal question jurisdiction on the
federal courts and preempts contrary state law.' The only difference would be that, while internationalists generally claim that all
CIL has federal common law status, Sosa clearly limited that status
to a subset of customary law that can be identified with a much
higher degree of definiteness than is ordinarily required.
I think reading Sosa to federalize the CIL norms enforced in
Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") cases is mistaken and, what's more,
that Judge Fletcher's overall position works better if he does not
insist on this point. It is crucial to distinguish between the law that
'See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 869
(2007).
5542 U.S. 692 (2004). Judge Fletcher's essay is entitled International Human Rights
in American Courts, 93 Va. L. Rev. In Brief 1 (2007),
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/03/22/fletcher.pdf.
6 Fletcher, supra note 5, at 7.
'Compare, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International
Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev.
815 (1997) (arguing that CIL does not have the status of federal common law), with
Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1824
(1998) (defending the internationalist view). For my own contribution, see Ernest A.
Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 Va. J. Int'l L.
365 (2002).
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provides the substantive rule of decision in a case and the law that
confers a right upon the plaintiff to bring the lawsuit. Most of the
time, the same law that provides the plaintiff's cause of action will
also supply the rule of decision on the merits. But this is not always
the case. State law, for instance, may provide a cause of action in
tort, but the plaintiff may elect to establish fault on a negligence
per se theory by showing that the defendant violated a federal
regulatory standard. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides a federal cause of action against federal officers but specifies that state
law will provide the rule of decision on liability. The best reading
of Sosa, in my view, is that the ATS presupposes that federal common law creates an implied right of action for aliens who have suffered a tort in violation of international law, but that the international law rule of decision retains the status that it has always had
in American law-that is, it remains the sort of "general law" that
Judge Fletcher discussed in his seminal article on marine insurance.
Justice Souter wrote for the majority in Sosa that:
[A]lthough the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new
causes of action ... [the] jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the understanding that the common law
would provide a cause of action for the modest number of international law violations with a potential for personal liability at
the time.9
We know that this cause of action is a federal one, because Justice
Souter invoked both Judge Henry Friendly's "new federal common
law" and the Court's more recent cases on implied federal rights of
action under federal statutes. ' Recognition of a federal cause of action is enough to decide Sosa, because it both provides the plaintiff

I develop this reading in slightly more detail in Ernest A. Young, Sosa and the Retail Incorporation of International Law, 120 Harv. L. Rev. F. (forthcoming Mar.
2007). See also Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 4 (offering yet another reading of Sosa that is more similar to than different from both Judge Fletcher's reading
and my own).
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
"See id. at 726-27 (citing Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New
Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383 (1964), and Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275 (2001)).
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with a right to sue and brings the ATS within Article III's provision
for federal question suits; it is well established, after all, that "[a]
suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action."11
Nothing in Sosa suggests the Court meant to take the further
step of federalizing the CIL rules of decision that would be enforced through the federal private right of action. Each time that
the majority referred to those rules of decision, it was careful to describe them as "international" in character; at one point, for example, Justice Souter spoke of "private rights of action under an international norm."' 2 Nowhere did he refer to the underlying
customary principles as themselves federal in character. Federalizing those principles would not only be unnecessary to the decision
in Sosa, but also unnecessary to the ATS's core purpose as described by the Court. It would also be inconsistent with Justice
Souter's prior account, in the Eleventh Amendment cases, of the
Founding Generation's great caution about incorporating
the
3
common law in federal (rather than state) jurisprudence.
Most of Judge Fletcher's discussion is perfectly consistent with
this distinction between causes of action and rules of decision. In
fact, his account of state court autonomy in determining the extent
to incorporate CIL arguably depends on treating customary norms
as something other than federal in character. Judge Fletcher suggests that state courts should be free to recognize CIL norms,
through their own state law procedural vehicles, outside the narrow categories approved in Sosa 4 But if we read Sosa as federalizing CIL rules of decision, then it is hard to see why federal decisions to exclude certain norms from the category should not be just
as binding on the states as decisions to include certain norms. The
Judge's position becomes considerably more plausible-indeed,

"See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
American Well Works was construing the statutory reach of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, but its
conclusion applies a fortiori to Article III itself. A federal right of action is not a necessary condition for arising under jurisdiction, even under § 1331, but it is certainly a
sufficient one. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Daniel J. Meltzer & David L. Shapiro, Hart
& Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 864 (5th ed. 2003).
" Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727.
"See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 101-16 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
" See Fletcher, supra note 5, at 8-10.
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surely correct-if we view Sosa determinations about the definiteness of a particular CIL norm as simply determinations about the
extent to which federal law will provide a right of action to enforce
norms existing at the international level. More fundamentally,
Judge Fletcher recognizes that, "[i]f we are to be true to nineteenth
century jurisprudential categories, customary international law
should remain general law, unless and until specifically incorporated into state or federal law."'" That would be consistent with the
general thrust of Justice Souter's opinion in Sosa, which sought to
keep faith with the ATS drafters' assumptions while translating
those assumptions into modern terms.
In the short space remaining, I want to underscore Judge
Fletcher's argument that state courts should be free to develop
their own interpretations of CIL and their own procedural vehicle
for enforcing CIL norms, except where they are forbidden to do so
by federal positive law. In particular, federal courts should refrain
from stifling such efforts either through a broad reading of Zschernig v. Miller" or through dubious doctrines of foreign affairs removal. The Zschernig doctrine lacks any grounding in the constitutional text-hence Judge Fletcher's inspired and damning
reference to the "dormant implied international relations
clause" 7-and the Supreme Court has never again applied it in the
absence of some positive federal enactment. It is, moreover, unworkable in a world of globalization in which much of what states
do can be expected to impact foreign affairs, and international law
bears on much of what states do.1" Foreign affairs removal-under
which some lower courts have allowed removal from state court on
the ground that a suit implicates federal foreign affairs interests,

Id. at 13.
389 U.S. 429 (1968) (striking down an Oregon probate statute on the ground that
it interfered with the federal conduct of foreign relations).
17See Fletcher, supra
note 5, at 9.
" See generally Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism,
83 Va. L. Rev. 1617 (1997).
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even though there is no federal law element in the case 1 -is an
equally unsanctioned and uncabined judicial creation."
What I want to stress here, however, are the practical advantages
of state court experimentation with CIL rules of decision. Americans have traditionally resisted broad human rights treaties and
broad readings of customary rights on the ground that wholesale
importation of international norms might have far-reaching and
unanticipated consequences for the U.S. legal system and, in particular, for the autonomy of state and local governments. A regime
of narrow federal enforcement of a limited and traditional class of
CIL norms, under Sosa, combined with state-by-state experimentation with a somewhat broader class of evolving CIL principles, may
offer the best response to this perennial concern. This sort of incremental incorporation of CIL into domestic law would also significantly expand the set of American courts participating in the
ongoing international discussion of the content of CIL. That may
well be a good thing in itself, as CIL is far more likely to evolve in
ways that are compatible with American values and interests if
domestic courts are part of the conversation.21
Sosa spells the end of the classic internationalist position on
CIL-that is, of categorical claims that all norms of CIL somehow
have the status of federal common law. As Judge Fletcher's essay
makes clear, however, the debate is just beginning, not only about
which CIL norms qualify for federal enforcement under Sosa, but
also about opportunities to enforce CIL outside the federal courts.
All of these debates will be more coherent and fruitful if we distinguish clearly between international rules of decision and the federal-law cause of action that Sosa recognizes to enforce them.

" See, e.g., Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997); Republic of
the Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1986).
" See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Stalking the Yeti: Protective Jurisdiction, Foreign Affairs Removal, and Complete Preemption, 95 Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2007).
" See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54 Duke L.J. 1143, 1221-29 (2005) (developing this point).
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